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PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The appellants, 6200 South Associates, Roger H. Boyer and Kern 
C. Gardner ("Associates") herewith respectfully petition this Court 
pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 to rehear specific 
issues involved in the appeal and addressed, part, in the 
Cour^ ' r Slip Opinion of March 23, 1994. Upon f\ ir bher 
« :;c:-ationr the SIip Opinion should be partially set aside and 
the judgment of District Judge Brian reversed for prejudicial error 
in law with the case remitted to the District Court for a 1 lew t:.] :i a 1 
issues Compensation. 
This Petition will address only two questions addressed in the 
main appeal and in the Opinion of March 23, 1994: 
(1) Did the Slip Opinion misunderstand or misinterpret the 
testimony and record of trial that the Clinger testimony, 
involving aerial photographs of highway interchanges in 
s.j 11 hake mid Davis 1 'ount. i en , Hailed l:o identify a single 
property, property access, size, shape, loss of access, 
or any factual data, whatsoever, that would have allowed 
le expei! to conclude that these wer e "access-comparable 
properties"? 
1z j Was the cutting off of Associates1 cross-examination of 
UDOT f s expert: i 1 1 t:l: le 1 ise of 1 iyp otl letical questions on the 
most critical and sensitive issue in the entire trial, 
prejudicial and not mere harmless error? 
' These sections uf the Miiirh ?! "I lll'i'H slip Opinion were, we 
respectfully submit, either factually misunderstood by the Court or 
erroneously applied• In either event, ~ rehearing is required to 
a v e 1: t a m a 1 1 :i £ e s t: 11 i s c a 1: 11 i a g e o £ j u s t i c e. 
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BASES FOR PETITION 
The issues raised in this Petition are of grave consequence to 
the entire body of law on business and economic damages in this 
State particularly in the field of eminent domain. 
1. The Testimony On Undefined "Comparable Access" 
Properties. 
The issue at pp. 7-10 of the Slip Opinion involving 
admissability of testimony and aerial photographs of totally 
unknown properties leaving the court and jury to speculate as to 
how and in what manner access restrictions, if any, were comparable 
to the access restrictions of the subject property, is of immense 
importance to the analysis and development of expert damage 
testimony in this State. When an expert is confronted, either on 
voir dire or cross-examination, as to an alleged basis of 
comparability, viz., in this case, access-comparability of another 
property of which he has told the jury on direct examination, and 
the witness admits that he knows nothing of the property, its 
access characteristic, its size, its ownership, its use, its 
impaired use vis-a-vis the freeway interchange, that testimony 
cannot stand. The reason is simple but profound . . . it requires 
the jury, as well as the Court, to speculate and conjecture as to 
just how this allegedly "access-comparable property" is, in fact, 
comparable. The witness, dinger, had not even seen the so-called 
access-comparable properties except by an aerial view. 
If the Court permits this evidence to pass muster under the 
feckless statement of the witness that he "considered the 
photographs as part of his larger appraisal", the Court will have 
driven a splitting wedge into the solid oak precedent that an 
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expert must at least be able to identify basic property 
characteristics as a predicate for the opinion on access-
comparability . 
2. Cross-Examination Is Harmless Error. 
As to the issue of whether being blocked out from cross-
examining an expert witness as to a series of hypothetical 
questions is prejudicial (Slip Op. at 10-12), the Court should look 
at the impact that its decision will have upon the trial Bar of 
this State. When a jury is told that hypothetical questions 
testing the accuracy of the expert's opinion is inadmissible and 
trial counsel is placed under a virtual quarantine of pursuing 
hypothetical questions on the most critical question in the entire 
case, can it be genuinely said that the preclusion of the 
examination was not prejudicial? Would this new rule of "harmless 
error of hypothetical questions on cross-examination" apply to 
criminal cases as well as civil? This Court has recognized the 
principle of law that full and open cross-examination is the sine 
qua non of a fair hearing, particularly of trained and wise experts 
who have been schooled in the art of socratic examination? What 
message does the Slip Opinion send to a party the size of UDOT to 
make a baseless, almost fatuous, objection to disrupt critical 
cross-exam . . . it may be worth a try because, even though 
erroneous, it could be swept under the carpet as harmless and de 
minimis error. 
These issues are of extraordinary importance to the Bench and 
the trial Bar of this State and, it is submitted, should be 




THE CLINGER TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE ON AERIAL 
PHOTOGRAPHS OF ALLEGEDLY COMPARABLE ACCESS PROPERTIES 
On page 7 of the Slip Op., the panel addresses the issue of 
dinger's testimony surrounding aerial photographs of properties on 
freeway interchanges which supposedly had comparable access 
restrictions to the remanent access of the subject property AFTER 
condemnation. The Court cited Redevelopment Agency v. Mitsui 
Investment, Inc. , 522 P. 2d 1370 (Utah 1974), on the question of the 
evidentiary foundation to meet the test of "reasonable 
comparability," but distinguished Mitsui from the instant case 
because it dealt with "comparable sales" (italicized by the Court 
in the Mitsui quote) whereas UDOTf s expert only used the 
photographs to establish "comparable access limitations." 
The panel Opinion then states, even assuming the application 
of the Mitsui principle, there appeared to be sufficient foundation 
in regard to the photographed properties establishing "reasonable 
comparability" of access and configuration. Thus, the Opinion 
winds up on the note that with wide latitude given to expert 
appraisers to determine fair market value, the trial court did not 
err in admitting the photographs of the "comparable access 
properties." 
The Court will search the entire record of dinger's 
examination in vain to find one scrap of evidence in which the 
witness, in describing the location of the properties on the 
freeway interchanges, could identify a single property that had 
access characteristics at all, much less those that were reasonably 
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comparable to that of the access remaining to the subject property. 
What this record will show plainly is that the witness Clinger, on 
voir dire and cross-examination, 
could not identify any particular or a single 
property claimed to be access-comparable; 
could not identify the configuration or the nature 
of the access to a single property in the 
photographs; 
could not identify how the properties . ;i the 
photographs were accessed, if at all, from >rimary 
or insular roads; 
could not identify even so much as a single 
ownership in the photographs; 
could not identify whether any of the properties 
had been partially taken by UDOT and all the 
primary access expropriated as in the subject case; 
could not identify whether the photographs showed 
properties which had been impacted by access 
restrictions due to interchange construction; 
could not identify whether the properties had been 
rezoned, downzoned, or their highest and best use 
changed as a consequence of access limitations. 
In short, Clinger could not tell Judge Brian and the jury 
anything at all about any properties, access situs, ownership, 
size, shape, use, difficulties of use, or u - ne 
photographed properties. Clinger knew nothing of them, whatsoever. 
All Clinger knew was that there were some unknown, undefined 
properties with undefined access near interchanges in Salt Lake and 
Da\ :l s Coui i t::I e s . .' -. ' , ' •" ' .,  
How can this Court possibly say 'r light of this conspicuous 
absence of a scintilla of evidence as to what properties the 
" 11 ti less was ev ei 1 1:a] k:l i ig aboi i t, tl lat ai 1 "adequate i jundation" was 
laid for admissibility? Does not the conclusioi1 in the Slip 
Opinion as to this critical issue send a message to UDOT and every 
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other government agency (as well as property owners) that an expert 
can simply get up and show photographs of an area including a 
polyglot of unknown properties without being able to tell the Court 
and jury a single fact as to any of the photographed properties or 
characteristics that are access-comparable. If permitted to stand, 
the Slip Opinion will be read as establishing a new rule in Utah 
overturning authority stemming back to the 1961 case of State Road 
Comm'n v. Peterson, 12 Utah.2d 317, 366 P.2d 76 (1961). It will 
open up a flood gate for incompetent testimony to be masqueraded 
before a court and jury under the guise of expert evidence. 
If the witness, Clinger, had identified and given appropriate 
foundation for the properties and delineated the access limitations 
which those properties had vis-a-vis the freeway interchange, a 
"sale" would not be required in order for the photographed 
transaction to be admissible. It could have come in evidence for 
purpose of establishing "comparability of access" vis-a-vis 
comparability of sale value. But Clinger had not a scintilla of 
information about the properties. It is this turn key issue which 
the Panel Opinion may have misunderstood or did not fully consider. 
It should do so on Reconsideration. 
II 
THE EXCLUSION OF HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS ON 
CROSS-EXAMINATION OF UDOTfS EXPERT, VAN DREMMELIN, WAS 
HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL AND REQUIRES, ITSELF, A NEW TRIAL 
The art of cross-examination of an expert witness is sensitive 
and difficult business. It is the crown jewel of the trial lawyer 
and the only effective means that he or she has to penetrate the 
glorious achievements and medals of the expert witness. The 
apotheosis of the expert is direct exam where he parades his resume 
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and infinite experience. It is cross-examination when the hour of 
truth is at hand. The effectiveness of that cross depends not only 
upon mouthing any question at any time on a particular subject, but 
the articulacy, timing and context of the question are of vital 
importance. 
Van Dremmelin was a seemingly skilled, polished and effective 
witness who came into the courtroom after 4 days of trial and told 
the jury that the Associates1 property was actually better-off 
because of the condemnation of all of its primary access to the 
north and west, then it was prior to condemnation. This was a 
monstrous claim and one that had to be met with the most 
scrutinizing and effective cross-examination. What the trial court 
did was not only to cut-off hypothetical questions on cross-
examination by Associates' counsel, but in doing so, effectively 
admonished the jury that hypothetical questions involving assumed 
properties not before the trial court, were irrelevant and not to 
be considered in giving weight to the evidence. The hypothetical 
question of counsel for 6200 South Associates, at the time UD0Tfs 
objection was sustained, was a prelude to a line of examination of 
hypotheticals in which one principle built on a previous principle 
and so on. Had the cross-examination been permitted (as this Court 
said it should), Van Dremmelin would have been forced to concede 
that the loss of all primary access with only back-door ingress and 
egress left after condemnation was a severe restriction in the 
typical case. What made this property atypical, would have been 
the concluding question. But that was cut-off by the trial judge 
sustaining the UDOT objection, an objection which this Court found 
to be plainly erroneous. 
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Certainly if the area of cross-examination that was blocked-
out involved a preliminary or relatively unimportant issue, there 
would be the basis for a possible finding of "harmless error" in 
the overall context of the full trial. But that is not this case. 
The area in which cross-examination was blocked was in the most 
critical and sensitive area of the entire case -- what had happened 
to this property as a result of all of its primary access having 
been condemned. Limitation of cross-examination on this epic issue 
was highly prejudicial and damaging, at the least. 
It will not do, we respectfully submit, to say that some 
cross-examination ultimately was allowed as to a non-hypothetical 
property. To a minor degree, the Panel Opinion's observation is 
correct. But to a major degree, it is fundamentally inaccurate 
because the hypothetical could not be fully constructed in the 
later example. The precedent of the Supreme Court in State v. 
Peek, 265 P.2d 630, 637 (1953) must weigh overwhelmingly on this 
point: 
There is no other instrument so well adapted to discovery 
of the truth as cross-examination, and as long as it 
tends to disclose the truth it should never be curtailed 
or limited. (Emphasis added). 
Is it to be the law of this Court that Peek doesn't mean what 
it says and that when cross is blockaded by objection on the 
critical question of the trial, the matter falls in that dismal 
catalogue of harmless error? We respectfully submit not. 
CONCLUSION 
Associates recognizes that Petitions for Rehearing are not 
favored. But the issues raised in this Petition are essential and 
if permitted to stand under the Slip Opinion, will present great 
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difficulties for the Bench and Bar relative to the foundation for 
expert testimony and the genuine importance of cross-examination of 
an expert. 
It is respectfully submitted that a rehearing should be 
granted as to the two issues raised in this Petition and that upon 
rehearing, the Judgment of the District Court should be reversed as 
to both issues and the case remitted for a new trial on 
compensation and damages. 
DATED this day of April 1994. 
Respectfully Submitted 
ROBERT S. CAMPBI 
KEVIN EGAN ANDERSON 
of and for 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 6200 South Associates, H. 
Roger Boyer and Kern C. Gardner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the 
law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, One Utah Center, Thirteenth 
Floor, 201 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in 
said capacity and pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, true and correct copies of the 6200 South Associates' 
Petition for Rehearing & Supporting Memorandum were served upon: 
Donald S. Coleman, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
i 
-tk. 
by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, this £ day of April 1994. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
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